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Introduction
Medieval Western Europe was witness to two important and long lasting political innovations, the practice of political representation and the tradition that rulers should obtain consent from these representatives when governing. Societies in other regions sometimes developed practices similar to these, but there is little doubt that they reached their fullest extent on the European continent. Important scholarly work in political science has acknowledged and emphasized the European origins of consent and representation (Pitkin, 1967 In this review essay I will use recent scholarship to consider three existing answers to the "Why Europe?" question. These involve the causal role of political ideas, the influence of economic development, and the constraints of warfare. 1 Each of these explanations turns out to have something to offer, and from them we can draw lessons for democratization in other places at other times. In the end, though, the best answer to the question may lie elsewhere. I will consider whether a historical accident helped pave the way for representation and consent to develop. This accident involved the political collapse and fragmentation that Western Europe faced as a result of Germanic invasions and the fall of the Western Roman Empire. In a curious way then we might say, "No barbarian invasions, no democracy."
How should we think about testing the different explanations? Practices of representation and consent began to develop in Europe relatively soon after the first millennium. We could then compare Europe with, for example, China under the Song Dynasty, the eastern Mediterranean under the Byzantine Empire or the Middle East under the Abbasid Caliphate.
When we do so, however, we are faced with very large inferential problems. There are a multitude of factors that differed between these four regions at this time, and isolating a single one as the explanation for democratization seems a hopeless task. This is no doubt why relatively few recent scholars have ventured in this direction. Three of the best efforts Looking only at Europe may prompt us to fail to realize why it differed from other regions.
Ultimately, a convincing explanation for why representation and consent first emerged in Europe ought to have two properties. It must first be consistent with cross-regional evidence.
Second, because cross regional comparisons have their pitfalls, the explanation must also hold up when making within-Europe comparisons. In other words, those areas of Europe that are best typified by the explanation should be those where practices of representation and consent were strongest.
In what follows I will first present a very brief survey of what is to be explained -the early development of practices of representation and consent in Europe and their failure to develop in other regions. This will be followed by an examination of the causal role of ideas, economic development, and warfare. Finally, I will consider the possibility that European governance outcomes derived from a historical accident. Even if all four of these world regions suffered "barbarian" invasions, Western Europe was unique among them in experiencing invasions that not only toppled the existing unified political order but also replaced it with a set of fragmented polities in which the balance of power between rulers and ruled favored the subsequent development of representation and consent.
Western Europe In a Global Context
Before evaluating potential answers to the "Why Europe" question we need to first consider what needs to be explained. During the two centuries after the first millennium, Europeans developed practices of representation and consent that would spread to varying degrees throughout the continent. These practices were unique in comparison with developments in Song China, the Byzantine Empire, or the Abbasid Caliphate. In Western Europe the idea developed that whether one was in an autonomous city republic or a territorial monarchy, those who governed ought to somehow obtain the consent of citizens or subjects. The Latin phrase most frequently used to express this was quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet, or in translation "What touches all should be considered and approved by all." We can find variants of this expression in an early city constitution of Florence from the late thirteenth century (Najemy 1979), just as we can find it in Edward I's convocation of the Model Parliament in England in 1295. The origins of quod omnes tangit, which first appeared in medieval usage in the twelfth century, will be discussed in the next section.
Several recent political theorists have emphasized the importance of this concept for the development democratic theory (Pitkin 1967; Manin 1997; Schwartzberg 2014 ). What has not been done is to ask why this idea emerged in Europe and not elsewhere. Along with new practices for consent, medieval Western Europeans also developed the closely related idea of political representation, and this too was present to varying degrees in both urban republics and territorial monarchies. The chief means of seeking consent came to be the summoning of an assembly at which representatives from different parts of a society would be able to express themselves. Practices of representation and consent were the most highly evolved in the many autonomous cities of Europe, but they also were frequent in larger territorial states.
Professed adherence to the practices of representation and consent was widespread across the European continent throughout the medieval and early modern eras. In some cases this resulted in very real constraints on rulers. In other instances rulers may have paid lip service to quod omnes tangit without doing much to implement it in practice. In these cases "consent" would have amounted to being called to an assembly to agree to something that had already been decided. One, admittedly imperfect, way to judge how widespread the practice of consent became is to consider the frequency with which representative assemblies met. A second way is to consider the prerogatives that they enjoyed in practice. Several There was no equivalent to the European pattern of representation and consent in the other three world regions to which I have referred. This does not imply any judgment about European superiority or about which region's citizens tended to have the highest levels of welfare. It is a simple observation that nothing looking like European representative institutions developed elsewhere.
In China under the Song dynasty, as argued in the recent survey by Kuhn (2009) , rulers professed to adhere to the principles of a "Confucian state" where they would be guided by certain principles of righteousness. To aid in this objective, and more simply in maintaining their rule, the emperors had an elaborate system for locally based officials to transmit information to the center. Chinese thinkers also subscribed to the idea of a mandate of heaven that implied certain obligations for a ruler. The following is an excerpt written by the Song councilor Lü Gongzhu in the year 1085, just about the same time that the idea of quod omnes tangit was first being applied to government in medieval Europe.
Although Heaven is high and far away, Heaven inspects the empire daily. Heaven responds to the deeds of the ruler. If he continuously cultivates himself and treats his people justly, then Heaven sends prosperity, and the Son of Heaven receives the realm for all times. There will be no misfortune and nobody will create trouble.
If he, however, neglects the deities, ill-treats the people, and does not fear the This statement clearly reflects a theory of government in which those who rule have obligations to those they govern. The same principle of the Mandate of Heaven had been invoked by emperors of prior dynasties and would continue to be invoked subsequently. However, if the concept of a mandate of heaven suggested that a ruler has obligations, this never extended to obtaining consent, nor did it involve assembling representatives to achieve this goal.
A priori the institutions of rule in the Byzantine Empire might have presented more of an opportunity than did China for the development of consent. From the fourth century AD the empire actually had a senate based in Constantinople composed of a hereditary class of individuals who had originally been enticed to migrate from Rome. The senate was an advisory body that had no formal role of consent over imperial policy, nor were senators specified as representing anyone among the diverse constituencies across the empire. The senate did, however, have some role in consenting to new emperors and when a succession to the throne was uncertain or contested. In the centuries to follow, rather than evolving into a true representative body, the Byzantine senate did just the opposite. Emperors found it expedient to grant new individuals and royal officials senatorial privileges, and the size of the body quickly swelled to over two thousand. The senate quickly lost any real influence as a body, and though it continued to survive and have some formal prerogatives, even these were completely revoked by the Emperor Leo VI. This happened about a century before the principle of quod omnes tangit would first be used as a principle of government in the western part of the European continent. In the words of the renowned Byzantine historian George Ostrogorsky (1969 p.245) "The Legislation of the Leo VI marks the culmination of an important historical process which had united the total power of the state in the hands of the ruler and placed all affairs of state in the care of the imperial bureaucracy." This was obviously not a fertile ground for the development of representation and consent.
At the same time that ideas about consent were developing in Western Europe, the Abbasid Caliphate ruled much of the lands around the Mediterranean from its capital of Baghdad. This was a high point of cultural and economic development. One feature distinguishing the caliphate was that many centuries before any Western European state would have a professional bureaucracy or a professional military, the caliphate had both (Kennedy 2006 ). The Abbasids therefore often thought of their operations in a division between "the people of the pen" and the "people of the sword." (van Berkel 2013). What the caliphate did not develop, however, was any systematic idea that consent should be obtained from those who were ruled, and this despite the fact that there was in practice something of a split between temporal and spiritual authority in the caliphate that might have opened up this possibility.
From the above survey it seems clear that medieval Western Europeans developed a new and unique form of governance. All four societies I have considered had institutions and principles for the relationship between rulers and ruled, and in some instances this involved the idea that rulers should somehow be constrained. Yet medieval western Europeans were unique in having institutions that provided such extensive requirements for rulers to obtain direct consent from those they governed. The next question to ask is why this was the case.
The Causal Role of Ideas About Government
The most direct answer to the question I have posed may simply be that Europeans had different ideas about government. Someone had to invent the practices of representation and consent to begin with, and if we look at this process of invention then we may better understand why it happened in Europe and not elsewhere. Individuals who invent ideas are often rediscovering things that were suggested previously, and scholars have proposed two ways in which this may have happened in medieval Europe. The first possibility involves the rediscovery of the theory of the classical Greek polis, and in particular the works of Aristotle.
The second involves the influence of Roman law. As it turns out, the second claim is more plausible than the first. However, rather than suggesting how old ideas place constraints on societies, this story instead shows how people can be very inventive in adapting old ideas to pursue new goals.
There is a long tradition suggesting that medieval innovations in government depended on the rediscovery of classical Greek texts and those of Aristotle in particular. Aristotle's
Politics did not describe a system of political representation because the Greek polis was based on direct participation, but it certainly did offer much food for thought to those who sought to establish an independent city republic. The theory of the polis -which is, in a certain sense, political theory in its purest original form -was cardinal to the constitutional theory of Italian cities and Italian humanists. It offered a paradigm of how a body politic might be held together when it was conceived, as an Italian commune must be, as a city composed of interacting persons rather than of universal norms and traditional institutions; and its value in this capacity did not end when it had depicted the policy as a moral community, since a city like Florence, whose normal institutional structure was that of a complex of interlocking assemblies, boards, and committees, could learn much about the theory of such a structure from Aristotelian analysis and Athenian history.
Pocock's claim may well apply to the development of Renaissance humanism in Florence and elsewhere. However, it cannot be used to explain the initial development of city republics in Italy. Aristotle's works did not appear in Western Europe in Latin translation until around 1260, long after ideas about consent were developed and long after independent city republics had emerged. This point has also been emphasized by Monahan (1987) The influence of Roman law presents a much more plausible explanation for the emergence of representation and consent than does reference to Aristotle. What is fascinating about this story, however, is that rather than simply rediscovering Roman ideas and then applying them, medieval Europeans used roman legal concepts in a fundamentally new way to suit new purposes. We will see this with respect to both consent and representation.
Consider first the case of quod omnes tangit. This phrase had been part of Roman law and was incorporated in the law code compiled by advisors to the Byzantine Emperor Justinian around 530 AD. The curiosity though is that in the Justinian Code quod omnes Stasavage (2014) . The vertical line marks the approximate date at which Aristotle's Politics first appeared in direct translation to Latin tangit referred strictly to private affairs between individuals and not to affairs of state. As described by Post (1964 p.169) in the Justinian code it was stated that if several people had common stewardship (tutores) over something, then that stewardship could not be ended, altered, or otherwise exercised without the consent of all. To take an example, if several people had common rights over a stream, then the principal of quod omnes tangit must apply to the exercise of those rights. To re-emphasize, there was nothing in Roman law or Roman practice to suggest that this same principle could or should apply to affairs of state or to rulers obtaining consent from those they governed.
Beginning some time in the twelfth century, Medieval Europeans applied the concept of quod omnes tangit in an entirely new way. The exact date for the concept's reappearance is unclear, but it is certain that it was scholars associated with the newly founded University of Bologna who were responsible for the development. The principle of quod omnes tangit in its new formulation was referred to by Gratian in his Decretum (circa 1140), and it soon would be applied in both ecclesiastical and secular assemblies (Manin 1997; Monahan 1987 ).
It was used by Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) for ecclesiastical assemblies (Congar 1958 ). It was used by the Emperor Frederick II when summoning representatives from Italian cities to an assembly on two separate occasions in the year 1231 (Monahan 1987 ). We also know that Edward I invoked the the principle of quod omnes tangit when convening the Model Parliament in 1295. For this reason some nineteenth century English scholars, and in particular William Stubbs, erroneously took this to be the origin of its use in affairs of state. The more accurate view is to say that the principle of quod omnes tangit did indeed take root in England, but in its medieval version it was first developed in Bologna and then subsequently spread throughout Europe.
As they did with the development of theories of political consent, when developing ideas about political representation, medieval Europeans adopted a very similar strategy -use Roman terminology and Roman law adapted to a new purpose. A first step was the development of the concept that one person could act for another, or for a group of individuals. The European political landscape circa 1200 was one where there were numerous autonomous towns, church groups and other corporate entities all of which had some claim of self-governance.
Both ecclesiastical and secular rulers faced the thorny question of how to interact with these entities. The solution adopted was to have one individual act for the corporate group, and once again it was scholars who were trained at Bologna who were critical in spreading this idea (Post 1964) . So, in the Spanish kingdoms of León and Aragón individual towns sent procuradores to royal assemblies. In ecclesiastical assemblies corporate groups sent procurators. This was a Latin term that had been used by the Romans in a totally different sense.
For the Romans a procurator was a person charged with governing a province and not an individual acting for or expressing the views of the inhabitants of that province. So, for example, Pontius Pilate was the procurator of Judea. Such individuals also existed in Song dynasty China where the closest analogue was a prefect or cishi. In China, however, there was no shift towards having these individuals acting for the population they administered or obtaining their consent.
The experience of medieval procurators or procuradores shows how once again medieval Europeans had adapted Roman law to suit a new objective. It would also seem that the causal sequence was that cities and towns became autonomous first, creating a need to readapt Roman legal concepts. Gaines Post, one of the foremost historians who worked on this question, described the process as such.
It is as if the lawyers and judges had suddenly realized that there were numerous communes with their institutions and officers, and numerous merchant and craft guilds, and that they must at once apply the newly discovered principles of Roman law to them. Once more the rise of Bologna and the new Roman law of the utmost importance in the civilization of the twelfth century (Post 1964 p.69) The final step in this process was to develop an explicit idea of political representation. As observed by Hanna Pitkin (1967) in her classic study on the subject, the Romans made use of the word repraesentare from which our word representation derives. However, the Romans used this strictly in the sense of making something that was absent present or depicting something through a work of art. They never used it in the sense of one human being acting for others. Just as was the case with quod omnes tangit, the term repraesentare had nothing to do with politics. Medieval Europeans took the Roman concept of representation and adapted it to a new circumstance. Georges de Lagarde (1937) suggests that the new use of the term "representation" spread widely during the first decades of the fourteenth century as part of attempts to justify the rights of assemblies across Europe, assemblies that were taken as representing the social groups from which they were drawn. After all, Roman tradition initially wasn't necessarily favorable to the full development of consent in Western Europe either. Yet medieval Europeans were able to draw on Roman tradition in creative ways to greatly expand the idea.
In the end, the example of Roman law shows that ideas did play some role in the development of representation and consent. However, rather than seeing ideas only as constraints, or as the weight of the past, what is clear form this story is that old ideas can be adapted to suit new purposes. This provides an important lesson when we want to think about obstacles to democratization today. When people sometimes assume that a society has traditions incompatible with democracy they ignore they way in which local traditions and concepts can be reshaped to suit new goals. Per Capita GDP in the Year 1000 To sum up, there is strong suggestive evidence that within Europe more economically developed areas were more likely to have active representative assemblies. Yet when we remember that Europe at the turn of the millennium was not one of the most advanced areas of the globe, it seems hard to suggest that economic development was the main reason for
Europe's political divergence from other areas. Something else must have been afoot.
The Constraints of Warfare
Warfare is a third factor that could have favored the development of representation and consent. We have plausible examples from recent times where social groups have demanded rights in exchange for war participation (Levi 1997; Klinkner & Smith, 1999) . The same has been suggested for the past. It is said that medieval European rulers sought to fight wars, and in order to obtain the funds necessary to do this they felt compelled to establish representative institutions that gave taxpayers certain privileges (Levi 1988; Bates & Lien 1985; Blockmans 1998; Stasavage 2011 ). This same story has been applied to Europe in later centuries (Dincecco, 2013 (Dincecco, , 2011 ) and more contemporary times by Besley and Persson (2013) .
Much of the literature focuses on the idea that assemblies were important because if rulers obtained consent, then they could raise more taxes. This is very plausible. However, there was also another critical component to the story. In an era where Western European states lacked effective tax bureaucracies, members of representative assemblies, and the groups that they represented also played a very direct role in tax administration (Herb 2003) .
In this section I will suggest that there is much truth to these arguments, and the within Europe evidence is supportive. In the medieval era the demands of war in Western Europe were intimately linked with the development of representative institutions. However, the between regions evidence suggests that there must be something else to the story. Byzantine rulers, Abbasid caliphs, and Chinese emperors all fought frequent wars, but they did so while adopting a completely different governance strategy from medieval Western European leaders.
Instead of establishing representative assemblies, they taxed without obtaining consent, and they used centralized bureaucracies to achieve this goal. The lesson then is that if we think of representative assemblies as important state institutions, then war did indeed make the state as Tilly (1992 Tilly ( , 1975 and everyone who cites his famous line believes. However, war only had this effect because a more complete state involving a centralized bureaucracy along the Chinese, Byzantine, or Abbasid model did not already exist.
We can use the data set compiled by Stasavage (2010) to investigate the within Europe evidence on warfare and representation. The dataset from this paper considers polities in fifty year time periods. It shows that in cases where a polity was at war less than half of the time, then a representative assembly tended to meet about once every four years. In instances where a polity was at war more than half the time then assemblies on average met once every two years. This is a large difference. It is also a difference that is statistically significant when running a regression that includes both polity fixed effects and time period fixed effects. In this same dataset we can also see that polities at war were more likely to have representative assemblies that enjoyed prerogatives to review and to oppose new tax measures.
So far the evidence points to some sort of causal link between warfare and representative institutions. Ideally we could also establish whether this effect was temporary or permanent.
If the effect of warfare was temporary, this may reflect the fact that rulers called assemblies when they needed them and dispensed with them when this was no longer the case. France during the Hundred Years way provides a good example of this phenomenon. French monarchs during this long war called the Estates-General more frequently than they had in the past, but after wars ended they reverted to prior form. If the effect were instead permanent, then warfare today would have led to some sort of lock-in effect. The arrival of peace would not lead to a representative institution withering away. Perhaps once the fixed cost to maintaining an assembly is spent the ongoing costs of maintaining it in the future is relatively easy. Here the statistical evidence drawn from Stasavage (2010) provides no definitive answer. Simple descriptive statistics show that past war incidence is indeed associated with more intensive current political representation. However, the econometric evidence is less robust. The relationship is not statistically significant when controlling for country and time period fixed effects.
It is clear that warfare in Western Europe favored the rise of representative institutions, even if we do not know for sure whether this effect was temporary or permanent. Some might suggest that somehow Western Europe was more war prone than other regions, and so the warfare hypothesis also passes the cross-regional test. The problem is that this simply was not true. Consider the evidence presented by Philip Hoffman (2015) . He shows that between 1500 AD and 1799 China was at war fifty-six percent of the time while France was at war fifty-two percent of the time, England was at war fifty-three percent of the time, Spain eighty-one percent of the time, and the Austrian dominions twenty-four percent of the time.
Clearly we cannot simplify and think of a peaceful China and a warlike Europe. Nor would a comparison with the Abbasid caliphate or Byzantium produce a different result. These two states also were constantly at war, and often with each other.
If we think of "war" in general, then the within Europe evidence suggests that it mattered whereas the between region evidence suggests that it did not. These seemingly discordant 6 Was It All Just an Accident?
So far I have argued that political ideas, economic growth, and warfare all had something to do with the development of practices of consent and representation in Europe. Yet none of these explanations suffices as an answer to the "Why Europe?" question. In this section I will propose a different approach. We have known since Levi (1988) Also, under the weight of these invasions the Roman tax system had increasingly collapsed (Wickham 1984 ).
The Germanic kingdoms that replaced the Roman Empire in the West had two key characteristics that would matter for consent and representation: small size and relatively weak rulers. I will consider each in turn.
The first characteristic was that these kingdoms were smaller and more fragmented than either the empire that preceded them or the empires that existed in Byzantium, the Caliphate, Both the cross-regional and within-Europe evidence support the Blockmans hypothesis.
Representation and consent emerged in Western Europe, which had become fragmented, rather than in Byzantium, the Abbasid Caliphate, or China, which were more unified. The within Europe evidence also supports the hypothesis. In work published elsewhere (Stasavage 2010 ) I have shown that within Europe, smaller polities tended to have representative assemblies that were more active and which had more extensive prerogatives. These are robust statistical estimates, and they point to one important reason why the Germanic invasions helped lead ultimately to the development of consent and representation. Differential polity size also helps explain why Pocock's "Machiavellian Moment" took place in Florence and not Paris. Finally, we might also refer to small polity size when examining prior episodes of consent based governance, and in particular that which arose in Classical Greece as surveyed recently by Ober (2015) . In fact, the Greek parallel may go even further to the extent that the emergence of small polities was itself preceded by the collapse of a prior centralized political order, as Ober argues in Chapter six of his book.
The second consideration was that the bargaining position of Western European rulers after the fall of Rome was weak for reasons that have been highlighted by Wickham (2009 Wickham ( , 2005 Wickham ( , 1984 . They lacked a centralized tax bureaucracy that might have allowed them to raise money without obtaining consent and assistance from representatives. This distin- explain why consent and representation did not evolve independently in multiple places or why they did not diffuse more widely and more rapidly from Europe. The second possibility is that both systems with and without consent each had their own "self-reinforcing" logic to them, to use the phrase proposed by Greif & Laitin (2004) . This could have been the case if they each provided those who governed with the optimal means of securing their rule given the other factors determining their influence over societal actors.
Conclusion
When we think about why representation and consent first emerged Europe there is no doubt we should pay attention to ideas about governance, to economic modernization, and to the demands of warfare. Each of these three factors holds lessons for how we think about democratization today. However, at the end of the day we also need to think about how underlying conditions alter the balance of forces between rulers and the governed. We must also consider how historical accidents can alter this relationship.
The example of Roman law shows that past ideas provide an important repository for people shaping new political regimes. However, rather than simply acting as a constraint, it also shows how past ideas can be reshaped and reformed to suit new desires. Transport this idea to today's world and it suggests that we should be skeptical of the notion that the underdevelopment of practices of consent in China, for example, is somehow determined by the absence of a long tradition pointing in this direction. I suspect that if such practices do become more firmly anchored in China, then it will be as a result of the adaption of existing Chinese legal or political concepts to suit new purposes and new desires, just as medieval
Europeans did with Roman law.
The example of economic modernization suggests that a developed economy is not a necessary condition for democracy, but it certainly doesn't hurt. Europe became an economic leader far too late in the game for this to explain its unique role in developing practices of representation and consent. All the same, within Europe, and in an era of political fragmentation, the most economically developed regions led the way. One could say then that there is conditional support for the modernization hypothesis -modernization mattered as long as the other enabling conditions were also in place.
As a third factor, the experience of warfare certainly contributed to the development of representation and consent in medieval Europe. A representative assembly turned out to be a useful means of raising money. However, war only had this effect because of underlying conditions. The small size of European states made it possible to actually maintain an active assembly. The absence of a centralized bureaucracy tax collection meant that European rulers had all the more reason to rely on assemblies for finance and therefore to pay heed to principles such as quod omnes tangit.
In the end, the underlying European conditions favorable to the development of consent and representation can best be described as a historical accident. The barbarian invasions, perhaps sparked by climate change, that led to the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West produced a set of small and fragmented policies where it was feasible to organize representation and also desirable for rulers to do so. Simultaneously, the alternative route to state development involving a strong centralized bureaucracy, without institutions of consent, was not a possibility. The lesson for democracy in more recent times is then that we need to consider how underlying conditions involving geography, technology, or other factors make it both feasible and desirable for both rulers and ruled to maintain a system in which political consent matters.
